Over the past week, Gov. Christie has been in Camden twice, once to tout the new police force as a policy model, and once in support of education changes. In doing so, there has been a lot of numbers thrown around regarding the new police force, some optimistic, and some that indicate the force is downgrading arrests. But none of these pieces has pointed out the obvious; Camden faced a violent crime epidemic in part because of layoffs caused by municipal cuts by Gov. Christie. The Governor is now taking credit for numbers normalizing back to the historical rates that existed before his catastrophic cuts.

Imagine via Lori Nichols/South Jersey Times

Back in 2010, Gov. Chris Christie made across the board cuts for municipal aid. For Camden, which depends on the state for the vast majority of its budget, these cuts were a “fiscal calamity” that endangered the city’s ability to provide basic services. The results were predictable; Camden lost 168 police officers, saw arrests drop, and crime spiral out of control.

If we are to judge the Metro Police, should it be against the skeleton of a force that remained after Christie’s cuts? Or against the historical performance in Camden of a fully staffed police force?

If we do the latter, the numbers just don’t look as good. That murder drop that Christie sited of 23% doesn’t look good in context:

I had a harder time getting historical data on short notice on Aggravated Assaults, but looking back at historical data from 1980-2005, they appear slightly better. At 163 aggravated assaults in the last quarter, that would be under the historical trend. The problem is, simple assaults have seen a large increase:

“The question is, Is it real, or a downgrading effect?” said Thomas Arvanites, director of Villanova University’s criminology program. “And I don’t know how you would explain it being real.”

The point of this isn’t that the Metro Police is failing. There are indications that leave room for optimism, and local complaints of the techniques used to get them. We won’t know if the Metro Police is successful for years. 

Similarly, even without the miracle claims, there are reasons to support the Metro Police. The force is less expensive as a result of busting the union and rehiring officers for much less pay (although the sudden “finding” of millions of federal grant money shows how political that budget crisis was). There are also reasons to be skeptical, including the politicization of assault numbers, and complaints that the new force is less familiar with neighborhoods and is not culturally competent. 

But what is not up for debate is Gov. Christie’s role in the entire debacle. Gov. Christie’s slashing of municipal funds turned Camden from a high-crime area to a historically violent one. He deserves not to be compared to the historically bad conditions he helped create, but to the (still troubling) conditions that existed before he gutted Camden. Anything less is just selective memory.

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Comments

  • Thanks Stephen for continuing to blog the truth. Governor Christie caused the public safety crisis then expects to take credit for getting things back to before the huge layoffs in 2011. Until he solves the unemployment and poverty issues in Camden crime figures will always be high.

    Below is a chart of Camden’s crime figures from 1999-2013 per the attorney general’s UCR website. As you pointed out the spike in crime occurred in 2011 when Camden only dropped to 265 officers that was caused by the Governor’s cuts in aid to Camden and other urban cities.

    http://www.njsp.org/info/stats.html

    CAMDEN CITY N.J. CRIME DATA 1999-2013

    Year Pop. Crime Violent Non Murder Robbery Bugl. MV Police
    Index Crime Violent Rape Aggr. Larceny Thefts Emp.
    Assault P.O.
    1999 83,546 7,283 1,813 5,470 24 59 746 984 1,497 2,622 1,351 387 443
    2000 79,904 6,520 1,668 4,852 24 69 670 905 1,177 2,515 1,160 403 463
    2001 79,904 6,903 1,711 5,192 25 58 715 913 1,376 2,552 1,264 404 478
    2002 79,904 6,147 1,488 4,659 33 45 609 801 1,155 2,423 1,081 420 492
    2003 79,685 7,223 1,928 5,295 41 56 857 974 1,459 2,686 1,150 435 520
    2004 80,089 7,156 1,829 5,327 49 57 823 900 1,162 2,807 1,358 428 511
    2005 79,948 6,016 1,686 4,330 34 47 704 901 1,021 2,354 955 416 500
    2006 80,010 6,515 1,698 4,817 32 66 775 825 1,179 2,458 1,180 423 483
    2007 79,318 6,413 1,770 4,643 42 67 784 877 1,129 2,353 1,161 410 497
    2008 78,675 6,857 1,791 5,066 54 70 820 847 1,254 2,809 1,003 396 486
    2009 79,383 5,962 1,885 4,077 34 60 767 1,024 1,050 2,377 650 361 447
    2010 77,344 5,517 1,848 3,669 37 73 713 1,025 1,028 2,119 522 366 452
    2011 77,344 6,749 2,166 4,583 47 67 859 1,193 1,451 2,331 801 265 314
    2012 77,250 6,113 2,006 4,107 67 74 759 1,106 1,100 2,299 708 268 315
    2013 77,250 5,210 1,950 3,260 58 55 732 1,106 857 1,939 464

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